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ABSTRACT 
 
The trading and investment decision processes in financial markets becomes ever more 
dependent on the use of valuation and risk models. In certain, cases such as risk 
management, modelling practice has become so homogeneous that one is led to ask about 
the effect this has on the price formation process. Furthermore, should stable price 
patterns emerge from this, can sophisticated investors who have private information about 
the use and characteristics of these models make superior gains? The aim of this article is 
to test this hypothesis in a stylised market environment, where a strategic trader who trades 
on information about the valuation and risk management models used by competitors. 
Results show that for our particular market setting, such a strategy has an advantage over 
those that do not use this information. 
 
Key words: Financial markets, Multi-agent simulation, Performativity, Higher-order 
strategies 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent advances in financial mathematics and the ready availability of computer power 
have led to an explosive growth in the use of simulation techniques in investment 
decision making. Investors, traders, and fund managers have grown accustomed to back 
up their decisions using valuation models and risk management systems. More so, 
hedge funds and proprietary desks take advantage of mathematical models to scan 
markets for profitable trade opportunities and nowadays automatic trading systems even 
act autonomously in financial markets, with only minor intervention from human actors. 
 
As the use of mathematical models for valuation, forecasting, and risk measurement 
becomes more pervasive, it appears not at all unreasonable to speculate about the effect 
this might have on markets practice and price dynamics. MacKenzie (2004) talks here 
about the performativity of finance theory, in the particular case when well-established 
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models are not merely describing market behaviour, but are instrumental in bringing 
into existence what they mean to describe. In a similar vane, it is possible to argue that 
as investment strategies in certain markets become ever more dependent on the usage of 
valuation and risk management models, price patterns will no doubt exhibit regularities 
that have not existed as such before, and which should become more pronounced the 
more market participants adopt a coarse grained or homogeneous set of modelling tools. 
 
The aim of this article is to test this hypothesis in a stylised market environment similar 
to the one discussed in (Farmer, 1998), but with the addition of a strategic trader who 
utilises information on the valuation and risk management models used by the other 
market participants. Consequently as the decision making process of those relying 
heavily on models becomes more structured, sophisticated players such as our strategic 
trader might have a chance to take advantage of this by adjusting their strategies to take 
the pervasive model usage into account. Alternatively, a market regulator could use this 
knowledge with the intention of counteracting the negative externalities such a wide-
spread, homogenous use of models could have in financial markets. We will however at 
this point not follow that particular line of inquiry. 
 
 
2. Higher-Order Simulations 
 
2.1 Exploiting Counterperformativity 
 
In a recent article, MacKenzie (2003) noted that in the context of the 1998 liquidity 
crisis, modern risk management practice, and notably value-at-risk techniques, induced 
market interdependencies that lead to heightened price instability – a phenomenon that 
has also been commented on elsewhere (IMF, 1998; BIS, 1999; Mayer, 1999) – and, in 
some well-publicised cases, to large losses for the involved institutions. Although these 
problems have been put down by some commentators to inaccurate modelling 
hypotheses, it seems that in this particular case, risk models were counterperformative 
(MacKenzie, 2004) in the sense that they were a determining factor in creating market 
instability. Assuming a slightly relaxed definition of performativity, one can argue that 
the widespread, homogeneous use of any financial models, independently of their 
accuracy or correctness, ought to be constitutive of the price formation process, which, 
in some cases, generate adverse systemic responses. 
 
 
In (Peffer, 2004; Llacay and Peffer, 2004) we have analysed the counterperformative 
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effect that a widespread use of value-at-risk techniques has on the price dynamics and on 
the evolution of a trader population. In this article, we link (counter)performativity of 
valuation and risk management models to that of model-based investment strategies and 
in particular to the possibility of using higher-order strategies to gain a competitive 
advantage in tightly model-structured financial markets. Generally, agent interaction in 
financial markets is not strategic, which Morris and Shin (2000) associate with the fact 
that in normal times, financial markets are like roulette wheels, where the odds of 
placing a bet by a single player does not affect the riskiness of the gamble2. However, 
performativity – or more correctly counterperformativity – can severely affect or even 
invalidate these normality assumptions. And particularly in situations where investor 
behaviour is tightly linked to certain valuation and risk management models, market risk 
might take on a quality that is not adequately reflected in these very models. The 
question is then if in that case the counterperformative nature of some financial models, 
by reducing generic uncertainty and creating what Morris and Shin (2000) have called 
strategic uncertainty, allows sophisticated investors to make superior gains on their 
improved knowledge of the market structure. 
 
2.2 Simulations of Simulations 
 
The idea of directing one’s actions based on competitors’ strategic behaviour is not 
new, of course, and has been extensively dealt with in the game theory literature. 
Unfortunately, investment theory has little to say on strategic interaction in financial 
markets, although (Allen and Morris, 2001) discusses some noted exceptions. In fact, 
most models used in financial valuation, in particular those drawing on econometric or 
time series analysis, seem to dispense of the economic actor and its behavioural 
characteristics altogether or aggregate this into a number e.g. the counterparty credit 
risk. One of the many reasons why strategic interaction is apparently immaterial for 
such models is that in competitive markets, investors are considered mere price takers 
who cannot influence prices with their own trading activities anyway, and decisions 
therefore do not have to be based on competitors’ strategies. 
 
In financial practice however, situations where market participants behave strategically 
with regard to others’ expectations are not uncommon. In a so-called sunspot panic for 
instance, a bank can become insolvent if depositors withdraw their cash solely because 
they think others will do so, and since in that case withdrawing one’s own funds is 
                                                 
2 It should however be noted that the analogy with competitive financial markets is not complete since the 
actions of market participants are constitutive of the outcome – the price in this case – although the 
decision process does not account explicitly for the beliefs about other investors' strategies and beliefs. 
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rational (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Asset bubbles are a further example of such 
phenomena and are brought about by beliefs, not founded in economic fundamentals, 
about future economic gains. There has been some interest recently in what are called 
global games (Morris and Shin, 2003), which acknowledge the importance of higher 
order beliefs (one’s beliefs about others’ beliefs about others’ beliefs and so on) in 
determining equilibrium outcomes of games with incomplete information. 
 
To develop our argument, we start out from the idea of global games and apply it to 
situations where significant information is available about the structure of such beliefs. 
In particular, we assume that a large proportion of market participants’ beliefs about 
future events are closely related to the output from the valuation and risk measurement 
models they use. We view valuation, forecast, and risk models that investors and traders 
run on their computers as being simulations and, since we want to assess their market 
impact and strategic potential, make them the target of our own simulations. Following 
the notion of higher-order beliefs, we refer to such simulations of simulations as higher-
order simulations, a concept that allows us to explore what market impact investors’ 
decisions have that are guided by simulations of other market participants’ behaviour, 
which in turn is guided by their own simulations. 
 
 
3. The Methodology 
 
The dominant modelling paradigm in economics and some areas of social sciences 
draws on the pivotal concept of rational choice, in which optimisation of agent 
satisfaction, conceptualised in the theory of expected utility and the consumer choice 
theory, plays a central role. However, representing half-way realistic investment models 
would be an onerous, if not impossible task inside a theoretic-analytical framework and 
we therefore pursue a different approach here altogether. 
 
A growing number of researchers in the social sciences has moved their attention to 
multi-agent systems as a promising framework to model complex social interactions 
(Sawyer, 2003), and there has been some interest in employing this innovative approach 
to explain phenomena observed in financial markets (Chan et al., 1999; LeBaron, 1998). 
The most discernible feature which distinguishes MABS from other simulation 
techniques such as system dynamics modelling or Monte Carlo simulation lies in its use 
of multi-agent system as the fundamental reference framework within which to 
formulate models and run simulations. 
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Hence, to effectively address the question of higher order simulations in investment 
decision making, we present a simple multi-agent model of a stylised bond market 
where investment funds and relative value traders make investment decisions based on 
their proper valuation models and risk measurement techniques. 
 
 
4. The Model 
 
4.1 The Economic Environment 
 
We consider a financial market for two bonds )1(B  and )2(B  in unrestricted supply, 
where IFN  investment funds (IFs), RRVTN  reactive relative value traders (RRVTs), and 
SRVTN  strategic relative value traders (SRVTs) are actively trading both securities using 
different valuation models. We assume that both bonds are substitutes in terms of their 
specifications but that for particular reasons which we won’t specify further, both trade 
at a price spread relative to each other. The investment funds act as fundamental 
investors, deriving the perceived value for both bonds from a private, exogenous signal 
they receive before each trading period. The liquidity of the bonds is given by )1(  and 
)2(  and their initial prices are set to )1(0B  and 
)2(
0B  respectively. 
 
Agents place orders at discrete trading intervals where they decide how to change the 
make up of their portfolio based on the valuation models and, in the case where portfolio 
risk limits apply, on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) models. The capital that trading agents 
invest into the trading opportunities at each trading period is proportional to either a 
given constant or a utility-dependent factor c. In the latter case, agents gauge their past 
success based on a regret measure which will allow them to adjust the investment capital 
for the upcoming trading period. 
 
Since the strategy of the relative value traders is based on the price difference between 
both instruments, we define the linear price spread as 
 
)2()1(
ttt BBs  . 
 
4.2 The Market Price Dynamics 
 
Prices )1(tB  and 
)2(
tB for both bond issues are set by a market maker in accordance with 
the following linear price formation rule, whereby prices have to rise (fall) in the 
presence of over-demand (over-supply) by an amount that is inversely proportional to 
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the liquidity of the traded security 
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where )( 1
i
t  is the total time- t  excess order – the sum of all orders emitted in the time 
interval )1] t,t  – of bond i and )(i  is a constant liquidity factor that accounts for the 
depth of the market in the bond i. The disadvantage with this linear formulation is that 
prices can become negative, which could be avoided by using a log-price formulation 
for the price formation rule. Outstanding orders in any given trading interval are always 
filled at the quoted prices and the market maker absorbs the excess or covers the 
shortfall, adjusting the prices according to the impact function (4.1). 
 
4.3 First and Second Order Trading Strategies 
 
In our model, a strategy is a rule by which an agent A determines the next-period order 
vector )( 1
A
t  based on the information I he has 
 
t
A
tI ΘS 
)(: . 
 
Zero-order strategies are those that take only information from the system environment 
into account. In the context of financial markets, zero order strategies may not seem 
particularly interesting but they are exemplified in those decisions where for instance 
macro-economic factors play a role. However, traders in our model will not use such 
strategies. Second order strategies are strategy rules that depend not only on information 
from the environment, but also on aggregation and individual, agent-related information, 
such as the type of valuation models competitors use. Between the zero and second 
order strategies lie those that are most pervasive in financial markets, namely the first 
order strategies that use macro-level, aggregate or systemic information to direct the 
agents’ decision process. Here, price and volatility information are perhaps the two most 
important market aggregates. 
 
In the following we will introduce three types of market agents, two of which use first-
order valuation strategies and a third type which uses second-order strategies based on 
the knowledge of models the other traders use.  
 
4.3.1 Investment Funds (IFs) 
Investment funds are so-called fundamental traders, who are not interested in historical 
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price patterns of the securities, but in their intrinsic value. Each investment fund jIF  
updates his perceived fundamental value of the bond i in accordance with an exogenous 
random walk of the form 
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1
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1
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t
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t
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t vv     
 
where the 
),(
1
jIFi
t  are drawn from the normal distribution ),(
),(),( jj IFiIFiN  , with agent-
specific, time-independent drift and variance. In particular, investment funds’ value 
perception 
),(
1
jIFi
tmv 

 is modelled as a moving average over the past m  fundamental values 
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The initial value 
),(
0
jIFiv  is set to the price )(0
iB  of bond i. Using a MA(m) price dynamics 
also allows the SRVT to make reasonably accurate value forecasts. Investment funds 
emit orders, whose magnitude is proportional to the difference between the actual price 
)(i
tB  and the perceived value 
),(
1
jIFi
tmv 

, and is also proportional to the available investment 
capital for their strategy 
 
 ),( 1)()(),( 1 jjj IFitmitIFIFit vBc    . 
 
The capital factor 
)( jIFc  is either a constant or inversely proportional to a measure of 
regret, which we introduce in section 4.4. Once the agents have calculated the bond 
orders for the current trading interval, they update their positions in both bonds 
 
),(
1
),(),(
1
jjj IFi
t
IFi
t
IFi
t qq    . 
 
In section 4.5, we will introduce VaR risk limits for the investors portfolios, which may 
restrict the total position the investment fund can take in bond i.  
 
4.3.2 Reactive Relative Value Traders (RRVTs) 
Reactive relative value traders are a special creed of momentum traders and hence 
belong to the class of technical traders. Their strategy is quite simple, and is based on the 
change in price spread )2()1( ttt BBs   between the two bonds. As in the case of the 
investment fund, the relative value trader places orders that are proportional to the 
capital factor 
)( jRRVTc , which is either constant or reflects his idiosyncratic risk aversion 
and the confidence he places into his trading strategy 
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 1
)(),1(
1   tt
RRVTRRVT
t ssc
jj . (4.2) 
 
The order of the second bond is determined so that the net cash outlay in the trade is 
zero 
 
)2(
)1(
),1(
1
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1
t
tRRVT
t
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B
jj    . (4.3) 
 
Once the RRVT has determined the orders for both bonds, he will proceed to update the 
total portfolio positions according to 
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1
),(),(
1
jjj RRVTi
t
RRVTi
t
RRVTi
t qq    . 
 
4.3.3 Strategic Relative Value Traders (SRVTs) 
Strategic relative value traders base their trading strategy on a forecast of the orders of 
investment funds and reactive relative value traders. In the model as it stands at the 
moment, the strategic traders have knowledge of the past m orders 
),(
,,1
jIFi
tmtk   placed by 
each one of the investment funds jIF  and know the capital factor 
)( jIFc  each fund is 
using in their strategy. Given the past orders, the SRVT can infer the values 
),( jIFi
tkv   and 
hence calculate the expected value of the MA(m) indicator 
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from which the investment fund will calculate his next-period order, and where the 
‘tilde’ denotes a random variable. Taking expectations on both sides of expression (4.4) 
then leads to the MA(m) estimate the SRVT uses to calculate the orders issued by the 
investment funds 
 

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The estimated total order issued by the investment funds is then determined by 
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i
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The strategic relative value trader will then calculate the orders by the RRVTs in the 
current time period, which, knowing their capital factors, can be determined exactly and 
thus are equal to the one the RRVTs are calculating using (4.2) and (4.3). The total 
number of orders by RRVTs for both bonds is hence equal to 
 


 
RRVT
kk
N
k
RRVTi
t
RRVTi
t
1
),(
1
),(
1 

. 
 
In some of the simulations where agents use VaR risk limits (see section 4.5  for details), 
order constraints can apply which the SRVT can take into account when estimating the 
orders the IFs and the RRVTs are likely to issue. In that case, the SRVT needs to 
estimate the next-period position of agent jA  and determine whether a risk limit is likely 
to apply or not, based on the next-period forecast j
A
t
,
ˆ

  of agent jA ’s portfolio 
volatility. 
 
Having determined the current period forecasts of the orders for both the investment 
funds and the reactive relative value traders, the SRVT will estimate the next-period 
prices )1( 1tB  and 
)2(
1tB  using the price dynamics discussed in section 4.2. 
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and a trend adjustment so that the final price estimate is equal to  
 
 ),(),( 1)(),( 1 ˆˆˆˆ jjj SRVTitSRVTititSRVTit BBBB   . (4.5) 
 
The strategic relative value trader issues orders for bond )1(B and )2(B  based on the same 
spread momentum strategy used by the RRVTs, but with a next-period spread estimated 
using the bond price forecast (4.5) 
 
 tSRVTtSRVTSRVTt ssc jjj   )( 1)(),1( 1 ˆˆ  
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Their next-period portfolio position is thus 
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4.4 Regret Adjustment of Agent Strategies 
 
The market dynamics resulting from the trading activities in different agent populations 
is analysed in detail in sections 5.1 and 5.2 for the strategies outlined in the previous 
section. Up to this point, agents invested into their trading strategy independently of the 
actual success of that strategy. Since agents in our model cannot choose alternative 
strategies if theirs fail, they will want to reduce the capital outlay once it becomes 
apparent that the risk of loss is too great. To model this behaviour, we adjust the hitherto 
constant capital factor with an expected regret measure of the form 
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where )( 1

t  is the mean of total accumulated profits,   is a scaling factor, )( 1

t  is 
one minus the strategy’s confidence level,   is a measure for the investor’s risk 
aversion, and   (  ) stands for the frequency of loss (profit). Using the expected regret 
measure r, agents will determine at each trading interval the capital – represented by the 
factor c – they are prepared to invest into the trading opportunity 
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In order to determine the regret measure (4.6), agent jA  first calculates the accumulated 
time-t profit 
)(
1
jA
tG   of his portfolio 
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after which the confidence level is calculated following two different methods, a direct 
calculation of the profit frequency of a given strategy and a calculation in which we 
make the normality assumption for the accumulated profit. 
 
With the direct method, agents determine their confidence level w.r.t. their strategy by 
calculating the ratio of profits to total traded volume 
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where ),0max()( xx  . In the case of the normality assumption, agent jA  calculates 
the mean )(
)( jA
tG  and variance )(
)( jA
tG  of the accumulated profit and constructs a 
normal distribution in order to determine his confidence level 
 
)0(1  tt XP , 
 
with ))(),((~
)()( jj A
t
A
tt GGNX  . 
 
4.5 Portfolio VaR Limits 
 
We are now adding a risk model to the set of models used by agents in their investment 
decision making process, with the intention of inducing a certain irregularity into the 
price dynamics in the bond market, thereby possibly increasing the possibilities for the 
strategic trader to gain an advantage compared to the two other types of traders, and in 
particular to the reactive relative value traders, since their strategies are comparable. 
 
Currently agents determine the number of bonds they wish to buy or sell in a given trade 
interval using the strategy assigned to them. Since the market risk of their portfolio 
increases with the net position and the price volatility, we will impose VaR position 
limits which in effect curtail the risk of future losses. Value-at-Risk is a widely 
employed method to measure market risk of an investment portfolio based on the 
positions, volatilities, and correlations of the assets in the portfolio. Assuming that for a 
given portfolio   and time horizon ttt hh   the P&L
3 tV
~
  is distributed normally 
with mean 0  and normalised variance 2)(  t , we obtain the following estimate for 
the maximum loss within a confidence interval VaR  
 
htt tqVVaR 

 )( , 
 
such that VaRh VaRtV   })({P . After having determined their respective orders 
),( jAi
t , the time-t-1 change in value 

1 tt VV  of the portfolio of agent jA  is equal to 
))((
),(
1
),(),(),(
1
jjjj Ai
t
Ai
t
Ai
t
Ai
tit BBqV   
 . Given a maximum loss limit 
)( jAL  for agent 
jA , the upper bound on the time-t value of the portfolio is equal to  
                                                 
3 Profit and loss 
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where we will use a confidence level of 99% or, equivalently, set 33.2)( q . If this 
condition is not satisfied, the agent will reduce the time-t-1 orders to a level where the 
VaR risk limit condition is met and in a way that the proportion of the bonds in the 
portfolio does not change. Suppose that the time-t value of the portfolio exceeds the 
maximum permitted and that the difference between tV  and the maximum time-t value 
and the residual value is denoted by  tV , and that we need to reduce the time-t-1 orders 
with the asset proportionality factor defined as )1()2( qq . In that case, the orders will 
have to be reduced by the following amounts 
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so that the VaR condition is satisfied for both bonds. The volatility of the two-bond 
portfolio  t  is calculated taking into account the historical correlation between both 
bonds 
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with 
),( jAi
tq  being the relative size of the position of asset i , and the bond volatility at 
time t calculated over a window of size   using the following standard expression 
 

 








 

t
tk
i
k
i
k
i
ki
t
B
BB
1
2
)(
1
)(
1
)(
)( 1

 , 
 
and the correlations are calculated in the same window using a standard expression as in 
the case of the bond volatilities. 
 
 
 13 
5. Market Simulations 
 
By using a multi-agent simulation of the market described above, our aim is twofold. 
First, we want to illustrate the impact that a widespread use of valuation and risk models 
have on price formation and market stability. Second, and more importantly, we want to 
address the question of using simulations of competitors’ decision models to inform 
one’s investment strategies. In particular, we would like to appraise the effectiveness of 
using higher order simulations in the investment process for our particular market. 
 
5.1 Case 1: A Population of Investment Funds and Reactive Relative Value Traders 
 
In a first series of simulation experiments, we consider a trading context without the 
presence of higher order strategies, and hence a population consisting only of investment 
funds and reactive relative value traders. In each of the cases, the variable parameters of 
which are listed in table 5.1 below, 20 investment funds and RRVTN  reactive relative 
value traders buy and sell the two available bonds, and market prices are updated by a 
market maker absorbing order excesses and shortfalls as they arise over time. The 
number of trading intervals in each round is equal to 200 and a total of four experiments 
E1.1 – E1.4 have been carried out4. The initial price for both bonds is 2,1,10)(0  iB
i , 
the size of the volatility window for VaR calculations is 25 , the drifts of the agent-
specific, exogenous value processes are drawn from the uniform distribution 
)03.0,03.0(U , and the volatility is equal to 0.2 for all the processes. All experiments 
have been carried out with both the capital factor set to 1 and with making it dependent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on the regret measure discussed in section 4.4. The scaling factor   used in the 
expression for the expected regret has been set to 2/)001.0ln(  in all experiments and 
the risk aversion   of each agent is equal to 2 . No moving average is used to model 
                                                 
4 Each experiment uses the same set of random numbers so that the results remain comparable 
 
Experiment )2()1( ,  RRVTN  VaR  
E1.1 1.1 1 no 
E1.2 4 1 no 
E1.3 1.1 20 no 
E1.4 1.1 20 
)( jAL  = 0.5 
 
              VaR: agents using VaR position limits 
              Table 5.1: Parameter settings for case 1 
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the investment funds’ perceived fundamental value – or, equivalently, the window size 
has been set to 1m . The constant parameters have been chosen so that the price 
dynamics is reasonable and no results have been included where prices diverge since our 
aim is to analyse higher-order strategies in a working market environment. 
 
5.1.1 Single RRVT, Low Liquidity, and no VaR (E1.1) 
In this first experiment, a low liquidity environment increases price volatility and 
because of the overwhelming presence of investment funds, prices closely follow the 
random walk of the value process. In such an environment with erratically changing 
prices, relative value traders have little chance to make a living with their momentum-
based spread strategy. 
 
 
 Figure 5.1: Bond prices and price spreads for IFs and RRVTs 
It is clear from the results that the relative value trader accumulates losses with passing 
time and that investment funds on average gain. However it should be noted that the IF-
accumulated gains in figure 5.2 are averaged over all investment funds and that this can  
 
give the misleading impression that the IFs have a winning strategy, a fact which can be 
more clearly discerned from the strategy confidence levels shown in figure 5.2. In fact, 
 
 Figure 5.2: Accumulated profits and confidence level for IFs and RRVTs 
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as can be seen from the standard deviation of accumulated profits in figure 5.3, profits 
for individual investment funds are quite volatile and the confidence level seems to 
settle at around 0.5, the limit for a zero-sum game. The relative value trader’s 
confidence in his strategy however tends to zero as his loss making is gaining 
momentum. 
 
In figure 5.3 one can observe that as the mean of accumulated profits for investment 
funds rises, so does the average standard deviation. Hence, although average profits for 
the investment funds rise, chances to make a loss at any given trading interval are only 
slightly smaller than those to make a profit, and the probability that the loss exceeds a 
given limit increases with time. 
 
 
 Figure 5.3: Mean and standard deviation of accumulated profits for IFs and RRVTs 
If instead of a constant capital factor, agents apply a variable, regret-dependent capital 
outlay, the profit outlook changes for the relative value trader and investment funds 
alike. Looking at the price time series for bond )1(B  and )2(B , we can see that the price 
does not follow the value as closely as it did in the case where the capital factor was 
constant. In fact, comparing the average orders for bond )2(B of this case with those of  
 
 
 Figure 5.4: Bond prices and value processes for both bonds 
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the case where 1c , clustering of order excess and shortfall becomes apparent (figure 
5.5). 
 
In a rising market, investment funds that have consistently believed that the asset is 
undervalued will have entered long positions, which in turn will have generated 
substantial profits for them, led to heightened confidence in their strategy and therefore 
contributed, through an increase in their capital factor, to even larger positions. Funds 
that on the other hand have, in the same rising scenario, believed that the asset is 
overvalued, will have entered a short position in the hope to make a profit when the 
prices return to their perceived valuation levels. In the meantime however, these funds  
 
will loose money and therefore reduce the capital they invest into the fundamental 
strategy. As shown for bond )1(B  in figure 5.4, the influence of the longs in such an 
 
environment can be so strong that they manage to push prices far beyond average 
valuation levels. The reason for this is that upward movements in prices increase 
demand in the asset by longs more than decreases in prices are able to increase the 
supply by shorts, because of the asymmetry created by the differing capital factors. 
Short-lived downward moves also do not alter significantly the confidence of longs in 
their strategy despite their making losses. If the downward pressure persists however, 
longs with substantial positions will reduce their marginal capital investment in the 
strategy and their influence fades, while the confidence of shorts will recover and their 
influence on prices will rise. 
 
 Figure 5.5: Shortfall and excess clustering for IFs 
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 Figure 5.6: Average confidence levels and capital factors for IFs and RRVTs 
Comparing the RRVT confidence levels for a constant capital factor (figure 5.2) with the 
levels obtained in the case of agents making regret-adjusted marginal investment 
decisions (figure 5.6), one finds a noticeable increase in the proportion of positive 
payoffs for the relative value strategy to the point where it reaches the average level of 
investment funds. This is in stark contrast to the rapidly declining levels of confidence 
of the RRVT in the case of the constant capital factor. Although the RRVT is still 
making losses at the beginning of the trading round, these do not persist as in the 
constant factor case and profits recover after around 140 trading intervals. 
 
The dynamics of the capital factors for the investment fund is more complicated 
altogether and shows a behaviour that is in line with our discussion on the regret-
adjusted capital factor above. The left-hand graph in figure 5.7 shows all individual 
 
 
 Figure 5.7: IFs and RRVT capital factors and two individual paths 
capital factors for the IFs and the RRVT. The right-hand graph shows the paths for the 
capital factors of two investment funds, where one can clearly discern how the 
perception of the adequacy of the fundamental strategy shifts from a high-confidence to 
a low-confidence level and vice-versa. 
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5.1.2 Single RRVT, High Liquidity, and no VaR (E1.2) 
Setting the liquidity in the previous experiment of both bonds to higher values will 
smoothen the price time series and improve the profit potential of the relative value 
strategy, mainly because of the improved prediction accuracy of the next-period prices 
(see figure 5.8 below). Maximum absolute errors for instance are approximately five 
times as high in the low-liquidity scenario then in the case where 4 . 
 
 
 Figure 5.8: Comparing forecast errors of RRVT for the two cases of 1.1 and 4  
(constant c) 
Even in the case where the capital factor is constant, the relative value strategy shows 
much improved levels of confidence and accumulated profits do not show the downward 
trend they did in the previous example (see figure 5.9). 
 
 
 Figure 5.9: Accumulated profits and confidence level for 4  and constant capital factor 
 
5.1.3 Multiple RRVTs, Low Liquidity, and no VaR (E1.3) 
In this experiment, the liquidity was reset to the value it had in E1.1 ( 1.1 ) and the 
number of reactive relative value traders was increased from 1 to 20. In the case of a 
constant capital factor ( 1c ), prices tend to over- and undershoot the value process and 
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 the oscillatory behaviour tends to erode the profits of the RRVTs. Setting the capital 
factor proportional to the expected regret measure has a similar effect than it had in 
E1.1. Average accumulated profits and confidence levels are shown in figure 5.10 for 
both investment funds and relative value traders. 
 
5.1.4 Multiple RRVTs, Low Liquidity, and VaR Risk Limit (E1.4) 
Agents will now use value-at-risk position limits to constrain the order the issue at each 
trading interval. We have set the maximum acceptable market risk to levels where this 
induces a marked rise in volatility in the bond price process and acknowledge the fact 
that the oscillations this is provoking might be extreme, but nevertheless underline our 
case. Under such a scenario, bond spreads can change abruptly and even in the case of 
using a variable capital factor, the RRVTs  fare very poorly (see figure 5.11). 
 
 
 Figure 5.11: Price spread and confidence levels when IFs use VaR 
When introducing a strategic relative value trader into our market (see section 5.2), we 
will see that investing into the relative value strategy whilst being able to take into 
account possible future VaR adjustments can drastically improve profit outlook 
compared to the naïve relative value strategy used by the RRVTs. 
 
 Figure 5.10:Accumulated profits and confidence levels for variable capital factor and NRRVT =20 
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5.2 Case 2: Adding a Strategic Relative Value Trader 
 
In this second set of simulation experiments, we will add an additional trading agent 
who uses a higher order relative value strategy to trade on improved knowledge of the 
market structure, in particular of the models that other agents – reactive relative value 
traders and investment funds – use to determine their orders. Similar than in the previous 
case, 20 investment funds trade in each of the experiments E2.1 – E2.4 with RRVTN  
reactive relative value traders, with the main difference that a single strategic relative  
 
Experiment RRVTN  m  VaR  
SRVT knows 
about VaR? 
E2.1 1 1 no N/A 
E2.2 20 15 no N/A 
E2.3 20 15 
)( jAL  = 0.5 No 
E2.45 10 1 
)( jAL  = 0.5 Yes 
 
  m: moving-average window size; VaR: agents using VaR position limits 
  Table 5.2: Parameter settings for case 2 
value trader is also actively trading in the market, although in sizes that have only little 
impact on prices. In each trading interval, bond prices are again set by the market maker 
according to the price impact function (4.1). Each experiment6 consists of 200 trading 
intervals, except for E2.4, which compares profits of the SRVT with those of the RRVTs 
over a sample of 10,000 trading rounds (each consisting again of 200 trading intervals). 
The initial price for both bonds is, as in case 1, 2,1,10)(0  iB
i , the size of the 
volatility window for VaR calculations is 25 , the drifts of the exogenous value 
processes are drawn from the uniform distribution )03.0,03.0(U , and the volatility is 
equal to 0.2 in each case. All experiments except E2.4 have been carried out with the 
liquidity factors 1.121   . Simulation runs have been conducted both with a 
constant capital factor equal to 1 and with making it dependent on the regret measure 
discussed in section 4.4. The scaling factor   used in the expression for the expected 
regret has again been set to 2/)001.0ln(  in all experiments. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The liquidity factor   is equal to 2 in this experiment 
6 Experiments E2.1 – E2.3 use the same underlying random number sequences to ensure that the results 
are comparable 
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5.2.1 Single RRVT, small MA (m=1), and no VaR (E2.1) 
Parameters of this first experiment are identical to those in E1.1, however with the 
difference that a strategic relative value trader has been added to the market. The 
strategies of both the RRVT and the SRVT are fundamentally the same, but whereas the 
RRVT uses two past values of the bond price spread to calculate his orders, the SRVT 
makes a prediction of next period’s spread based on the knowledge she has on the 
strategies – or models – used by both the RRVTs and the IFs to calculate her bond 
orders. Results show that confidence levels of the SRVT are lower than those by the 
RRVTs by a factor of 1.5 in the case of a constant capital factor (c =1), although this is 
an exceptional circumstance in all the results that follow. In this particular situation, 
with only one RRVT actively trading in the market and the capital invested in the 
strategy time-invariant, confidence levels are very low and do not exceed 40%, thus 
making both strategies unattractive compared to a fair gamble. 
 
 
 Figure 5.12: Accumulated profits and confidence levels for variable capital factor 
Similar to the previous case, an environment with predominantly investment funds is not 
very conducive for the relative value trading strategy of either the RRVT or the SRVT. 
Given that the prices follow the random walk of the fundamental values closely, there is 
not much room for manoeuvre to exploit the direction of spread movements. 
Nevertheless, we can observe in figure 5.12 that the SRVT has a slight advantage over 
the RRVT and that her confidence in the higher-order strategy is quite high. Hence, 
although average accumulated profits are lower than for the IFs, the little profit they 
make is more certain. We have already mentioned in experiment E1.1 that accumulated 
profit graphs show average values and that profits change considerably from one 
investment fund to another. Confidence levels are only slightly higher then 50% also in 
this experiment so that the IF strategy does not fair much better than a fair game. 
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5.2.2 Multiple RRVT, large MA (m=15), and no VaR (E2.2) 
In this experiment, there are now twenty reactive relative value traders compared to only 
one in the previous experiment E2.1, and investment funds calculate their fundamental 
value forecasts using a moving average window of 15m . The increase in the MA  
 
 
 Figure 5.13: Forecast error for RRVTs and SRVT (constant capital factor) 
window size will induce a certain structure in the market – compared to the random 
walk of the fundamental value – that the strategic trader can exploit. In fact, as can be 
seen in figure 5.13, the price predictions the SRVT does based on a deeper knowledge of 
the strategies used by the other traders are much more accurate than those of the RRVT  
 
 
 Figure 5.14: Accumulated profits and confidence levels for variable capital factor 
who uses a simple historical momentum strategy. While the RRVTs do not seem to 
make any substantial profits, the strategic trader does very well for both constant and 
variable capital factor and her low prediction error allows her to make steady gains 
which in turn pushes her confidence level to 100%. In this second case, when agents 
adjust their investment capital in accordance with the regret measure (4.6), the price 
behaviour becomes much less oscillatory, which is beneficial for the relative value 
traders, and in particular for the SRVT. 
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5.2.3 Multiple RRVT, large MA (m={1, 15}), and VaR Risk Limit (E2.3) 
Our aim with this experiment is to analyse the effect that a VaR risk management model 
for IFs has on the price dynamics and the trade profitability. As we have seen in 
experiment E1.4, relatively low VaR limits tend to lead to a volatile price behaviour, 
which we have seen is affecting in particular the profitability of the relative value trader. 
In this experiment, we will analyse the results obtained by the strategic trader under two 
different scenarios. In a first simulation run the SRVT disregards the fact that the 
investment funds employ a VaR strategy to limit their positions and will face similar 
problems of making a profit than do the reactive relative value trader. In the second 
scenario, the SRVT has knowledge of the investment funds’ VaR strategy and 
incorporates this into her valuation model. 
 
 Figure 5.15: Accumulated profits and confidence levels for variable capital factor (incl. VaR) 
In the first case, figure 5.15 shows that the success of SRVT’s investment strategy 
suffers under the abrupt price changes induced by the use of VaR on behalf of the 
investment funds, even though these use a moving average model of the assets’ 
fundamental value (note that when the IFs used a moving average with a window of 
15m  in experiment E2.2, this was clearly beneficial for the profitability of the higher-
order strategy of the SRVT). 
 
 
 Figure 5.16: Price spread and accumulated profits for variable capital factor 
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However, in the second scenario where the strategic relative value trader includes the 
knowledge of the investment funds’ VaR strategy into her own valuation model, the 
profitability outlook changes drastically (figure 5.16). Even in the case where 1m , the  
SRVT makes a profit. From figure 5.18, one can see that the forecast errors are much 
smaller than for the RRVT, which is also reflected in the 100% confidence level that the  
 
 
 Figure 5.17: Confidence levels for constant and variable capital factor 
 
 
 Figure 5.18: Forecast error for RRVTs and SRVT (constant capital factor) 
 
 
 Figure 5.19: Forecast error for RRVTs and SRVT (variable capital factor) 
higher-order strategy attains in this environment, both with a constant and a regret- 
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dependent capital factor (figure 5.17). Although the forecast errors of the RRVT are 
generally small for a variable capital factor (figure 5.19), they become very large when 
the investment funds adjust their holding in accordance to their VaR position limits (see 
figure 5.16). 
 
5.2.4 Temporal and Cross-Sectional Analysis (E2.4) 
We will now present the results of a simple temporal and cross-sectional analysis of the 
relative performance of both the reactive relative value strategy of the RRVT and the 
higher-order relative value strategy of the SRVT. Furthermore, in a first set of trading 
rounds, the investment funds do not use VaR as a position limit, whereas in a second set, 
the investment funds choose their positions in accordance with the stipulations of their 
VaR risk model. For the purpose of this simple statistical analysis “by inspection”, we 
construct histograms for absolute profit differences between the RRVT and the SRVT 
strategy for both the cases where VaR is used and where no risk position limits are 
enforced. 
 
Both cases with and without VaR are generated by a set of 10,000 trading rounds, each 
consisting of 200 trading intervals. There are 20 investment funds and 10 reactive 
relative value traders trading in the market, where the liquidity factor   has been set 
equal  to 2, and where the VaR limit has been set to 5.0
)(
j
A
L  in the cases where 
investment funds use a VaR position limit. The temporal histograms are constructed by 
averaging the differences of RRVT and SRVT profits for two particular paths and 
repeating this procedures for all profit path pairs in the set of 10,000 trading rounds. 
Similarly, the cross-sectional histograms have been generated by summing the 
differences of RRVT and SRVT profits at each time point over all 10,000 paths and 
repeating the averaging procedure for all 200 time buckets. 
 
 Figure 5.20: Temporal and cross-sectional histograms of accumulated profit differences 
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We can see from these results that the higher-order strategy of the SRVT consistently 
outperforms that of the RRVT. The histogram of temporal differences brings perhaps the 
more relevant characteristic of profit differences to the fore. The profit differences 
between two individual paths can be thought of as a “strong” indicator of strategic 
superiority, since unlike in the case of cross-sectional averaging we compare two actual 
realisations of the profit process. The cross-sectional histogram on the other hand 
provides merely a probabilistic picture – it is a “weak” indicator” – of the strategic 
advantage of the SRVT, since it averages profit differences for all paths at each point in 
time. In the case where the IFs are not using a VaR model and price behaviour is not 
erratic because of this, the advantage of the SRVT over the momentum strategy of the 
RRVT is only small. However, as soon as the investment funds use their VaR model to 
set position limits, we see that the SRVT strategy pays off considerably. In particular the 
temporal histogram – our strong indicator – clearly shows that now where the 
investment funds use a VaR limit, the SRVT has gained the upper hand by using a 
higher-order strategy which takes into account the models used by the other market 
players. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Research 
 
In this article we have applied the concept of arbitrary but non-random performativity, 
as a natural extension of MacKenzie’s Austinian performativity, to a situation where 
investors employ higher-order strategies to trade on model-induced price patterns in a 
two-asset financial market. The extended concept of performativity used here includes 
situations where models do not perform their stated hypotheses, but where the resulting 
market practices and patterns assume nevertheless a stable existence and where 
stakeholders are perhaps reluctant to substitute the current technology with a better, but 
less known one. We have demonstrated that in a stylised economic environment in 
which the decision making process of fundamental and relative values traders is tightly 
linked to the use of valuation and risk management models, traders that employ second-
order strategies that explicitly account for the use these models by competitors, can in 
some cases profit from the emerging price patterns. 
 
The exploration of the implications of our market model was done using a somewhat 
watered-down version of what are called multi-agent based simulations – one would 
expect agents at least to engage in some form of communication in a real multi-agent 
simulation, or that they should exhibit a certain level of autonomy. There are initially 
two types of traders operating in the market: investment funds and reactive relative 
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value traders, which employ a fundamental strategy and a technical strategy 
respectively. In conjunction with the simple linear price impact function we have used, 
the combination of the two types of trading behaviour can be viewed as a minimal set-
up in which a reasonable price dynamics emerges. The investment funds – the 
fundamental traders – employs private, stochastic information of the value of the two 
bonds to decide if these are overvalued or undervalued, and to place their orders 
accordingly. Reactive relative value traders on the other side employ a simple spread 
momentum strategy to calculate their orders. Although the RRVT strategy is self-
fulfilling on its own – it always forces prices into a profitable direction – this changes 
when investment funds with their stochastic value process invade the market. The more 
volatile the price process, the worse does the momentum strategy fare in an IF-invaded 
population, which has been demonstrated in the experiments E1.1 – E1.4. 
 
To test the hypothesis of the exploitability of model-induced market structures by 
higher-order strategies, we have then introduced a third type of trader equipped with 
such a strategy into our market. Her strategy was basically the same than that of the 
reactive relative value trader, but instead of constructing a historical measure of spread 
momentum, this strategy included superior knowledge about the other market players’ 
valuation and risk management models and constructed a momentum measure based on 
a forecast of market orders. In case 2, we have seen throughout all experiments that the 
strategic relative value trader not only fares better in terms of absolute profitability than 
the RRVTs, but that the profit she makes with her enhanced strategy is worth more than 
the profit she would make with the naïve relative value strategy since, looking at the 
confidence levels, the risk attached to positive payoffs in the case of the higher-order 
strategy is lower than that of the naïve momentum strategy. In summary, the higher-
order strategy benefits from an increase in the number of RRVTs, a better predictability 
of IF orders (from an increase in the size of the moving average window), a variable 
capital factor, and an increase in price volatility through the use of VaR position limits 
when the use of VaR models is known by the SRVT. 
 
Two directions of future research are indicated at this point. Firstly, the strategy used by 
the SRVT has been chosen arbitrarily and changes in the strategy were not possible, 
except through an adjustment of capital outlay via the regret measure. We need to 
understand better – but always in the context of this stylised market with its particular 
price dynamics – how a successful strategy construction and selection process can be 
integrated in our model. In particular, the implications of the base strategies employed 
by investment funds and RRVTs has to be understood much better in order to gauge the 
results obtained after including a higher-order strategy. The higher-order strategies 
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themselves have to be constructed in a systematic fashion and SRVTs need to be 
equipped with a strategy selection mechanism. Secondly, the model used here is indeed 
very stylistic, and in order to create a more realistic trading environment with 
heterogeneous and possibly (semi-)autonomous agents, we need to move away from the 
equation-based, analytically motivated evolutionary economics framework towards a 
more flexible, multi-agent systems framework which, although embracing working 
concepts from evolutionary economics, also allows for the efficient representation of 
agent autonomy and sociality. 
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